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  1Abstract 
 
Broadly speaking, pharmaceutical policy in Spain has been unable to control 
either the price or the volume of drugs prescribed. Limited attempts have been made 
to bring together the regulation of the pharmaceutical market and policies, in pursuit 
of the desired goals of efficiency and quality. This paper assesses the regulation of the 
Spanish pharmaceutical market over the last two decades by examining regulation and 
policy and the available empirical evidence on their appreciable effects, and presents 
recommendations for policy design. Our findings suggest that policies aiming to 
improve efficiency and quality have not managed to contain costs, while cost-
effectiveness is still overlooked. We argue that future policies should encourage 
broader participation in the decision-making processes and promote a higher degree 
of competition, especially from generic drugs.  
Key words: Spain, generic penetration, reference pricing, negative lists, 
pharmaceutical regulation.  
JEL: I18, L51, l52, l65 
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1. Introduction 
 
Though health spending in Spain remains at a relatively low level compared to 
that of its European Union counterparts (7.5% of GDP in 2001), the life expectancy of 
the Spanish population – 75.6 years in males and 82.9 in females in 2001 – is among 
the highest worldwide. Pharmaceuticals accounted for 1.56% of GDP and 21.9% of 
public health care expenditure in 2001. On the one hand, in Spain pharmaceutical 
treatments have been given priority over other health care inputs (e.g., mental health 
care). However, on the other hand, the regulation of the pharmaceutical market and 
the policies implemented on both the demand and the supply side reveal significant 
“ambivalence”, and taken together have been subject to notable limitations in 
pursuing their intended goals. Indeed, the Spanish National Health System 
(henceforth NHS) funds 92% of the total pharmaceutical expenditure and the 
regulation of the Spanish drug market has provided meagre cost-containment 
incentives for both consumers and providers. Furthermore, incentives to improve 
micro-efficiency and quality reveal little success.  
 
As in other southern European countries (e.g., Italy), generic competition has 
been practically inexistent, generics accounting for roughly 6% of total sales in 2002. 
As we discuss further on in the paper, there have been intensive albeit limited 
demand-side incentives for the prescription and dispensing of less expensive drugs. 
Doctors are paid on a salary basis, and although capitation formulas are gradually 
being introduced into the financing of primary care, they do not apply to drug 
prescription costs (except for some geographical areas in Catalonia and Valencia). 
Although the NHS is a decentralised health system (López Casasnovas et al, 2004), 
price regulation is the responsibility of the central State, based on a rigid case by case 
cost-plus system and an untransparent negotiation system with the industry. 
Furthermore, reimbursement system reforms have led to the creation of a reference 
price system, which has not produced the expected results and has already been 
reformed. The effective sharing of the cost of prescribed drugs by the patient has been 
declining markedly since the early 1980s. In addition, some concern is expressed 
regarding the limited therapeutic efficiency and quality of new drugs. Nevertheless, 
significant institutional reforms have taken place. Especially, having to face the 
challenge of a European single market for pharmaceuticals has brought notable 
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adoption of the EU patent legislation in 1992). 
 
This paper aims to examine pharmaceutical policy and market regulation of 
medicines in Spain, and to evaluate both the achievements and the limitations of the 
last two decades by scrutinising relevant empirical evidence with regard to health 
policy debates. We also examine the conflicts that have arisen and assess the extent to 
which the government has succeeded in pursuing goals that serve the aims of both the 
health system and the industry. Furthermore, since the Spanish NHS is a decentralised 
organisation, we present a detailed examination of the role of devolution in the 
regulation of the country’s pharmaceutical market. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish 
pharmaceutical market and the key stakeholders. Section 3 examines trends in 
expenditure and consumption. Section 4 examines policies designed to influence 
demand. Section 5 is devoted to policies that affect supply, and Section 6 explores the 
regulation of the industry. The paper concludes with an evaluation of demand-side 
and supply-side policies and evidence in the context of current pharmaceutical policy 
debates.  
 
2. The background  
 
2.1 The government and regulatory bodies  
 
The NHS is tax-funded and provides free health care coverage, with minor 
exceptions such as non-refundable co-payments for prescribed pharmaceuticals. The 
general rate of co-payment for drugs has remained at 40% since the early 1980s. 
However, prescription drugs for pensioners and drugs consumed in hospitals are 
provided free of charge, and the chronically ill (for example, diabetics) pay 10%, with 
a price cap of €2.64. Private health care accounts for 20% of total health expenditure. 
Around 15% of the population has supplementary private health insurance, which 
does not cover prescribed drugs. In the early 1980s the NHS underwent radical 
reform, with the gradual introduction of a decentralised model involving the creation 
of 17 autonomous regional health services, corresponding to the 17 Autonomous 
Communities (henceforth ACs) into which Spain is divided. These regional bodies 
  4have political responsibility for health care, although, with the exception of Navarre 
and the Basque Country, they remain financially dependent on the State. 
 
The process of regulating the pharmaceutical sector has been particularly 
interesting due to the devolution process that has taken place in Spain. Pharmaceutical 
regulatory bodies are highly specialised. The Directorate-General of Pharmacy and 
Health Products (henceforth DGP) of the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs 
(henceforth MoH) monitor product licensing at State level. The same applies to the 
registration of new products, although the recently created Spanish Agency for 
Pharmaceuticals has played a more active role since the year 2000. Patent regulation 
is the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry in conjunction with two special 
commissions for economic affairs. The Interministerial Commission on Drug Prices, 
following the guidelines set by the DGP
1, takes decisions on prices after reviewing the 
manufacturers’ applications. The National Commission for the Rational Use of 
Medicines, which comprises representatives of the 17 ACs, the pharmaceutical 
industry, the medical profession, consumer organisations and trade unions together 
with experts appointed by the MoH
2, takes decisions on reimbursement. The MoH 
also sets the wholesalers’ mark-up and, in conjunction with a special commission of 
economic affairs, determines the retail mark-up.   
  
Because of the decentralisation process, responsibility for the regulation of the 
pharmaceutical market is shared between the State and the AC. However, most of the 
key regulatory bodies are run at State level in order to reduce diversity and to 
maintain overall control. The State oversees and authorises clinical trials, issues 
marketing authorisations for pharmaceuticals, controls the advertising of drugs and 
health care products aimed at the general public, licenses pharmaceutical laboratories, 
regulates the quality and manufacture of pharmaceutical products, sets drug prices and 
co-payments and decides which pharmaceuticals to include on the list of publicly 
                                                 
1 Manufacturers are required to provide scientific and clinical data on each drug, demonstrate its 
benefits compared with other products, propose ex-factory and retail prices and transfer costs, and 
provide company financial statements and estimates of sales and prices in the country of origin and in 
other EU countries.  
 
2 Reimbursement is based on the agreed price, the severity, duration and effects of the illness in 
question, population needs, clinical and social value, cost and efficiency, potential therapeutic strategy 
and the cost of similar available therapies.  
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authorisation of pharmacies, setting the criteria for the opening or relocation of 
outlets, day-to-day administration, promoting the use of generics, designing 
prescription policies via the development of prescribing guidelines and budget-setting, 
contracting pharmacists for primary and hospital care, setting the conditions of the 
agreements with pharmacies, and implementing cost-containment programmes. By 
law, they hold wide powers over the implementation of the legislation passed at State 
level in the pharmaceutical field. Furthermore, responsibilities for budgeting and 
management have been totally decentralised since 2002 and devolved to the 
governments of the Autonomous Communities. Nonetheless, public reimbursement 
mechanisms continue to be set at State level by the MoH, which is responsible for the 
co-payment scheme and partially responsible for the reference pricing mechanism.  
 
The Pharmaceuticals Act of 1990 is the legal basis of pharmaceutical 
regulation in Spain. More recently, the Cohesion and Quality Act of 2003 explicitly 
established that “the State will retain full responsibilities for the authorisation, 
registry, safety and control of drugs”. In addition, the regulations define the 
responsibilities of a new Agency for Pharmaceuticals and Health Products (Agencia 
Española del Medicamento y Productos Sanitarios, AEMPS) responsible for the 
evaluation and authorisation of drugs, while the Directorate-General of Pharmacy 
deals with both price setting and public reimbursement once the products have been 
authorised by the AEMPS. Since 2003, the Agency’s steering committee has involved 
representatives of the Autonomous Communities in decisions concerning the 
reimbursement of new drugs. Furthermore, in conjunction with the AC governments 
the MoH is responsible for policies relating to the rational use of drugs and for the 
provision of education for both the general public and health care professionals. 
 
2.2 The Spanish pharmaceutical market 
 
Spain is the fifth largest market in Europe for pharmaceuticals. In 2000 there 
were 262 manufacturers and 259 laboratories, figures similar to those of France and 
Italy. Total production amounted to €6,776 million in 2000 and the sector has some 
38,700 employees. The size of Spanish labs is medium, since the vast majority of 
them employ between 50 and 250 workers (Farmaindustria, 2002). However, Spain is 
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More than half of the pharmaceutical market is under the control of foreign 
companies, which have increased their presence in the country by buying pre-existing 
local companies. A cursory look at market concentration reveals that the top ten 
laboratories have 28% of the market. However, if we take into consideration possible 
market collusion and existing holdings, concentration indices may actually rise to 
levels that suggest a degree of oligopolistic competition (Cabiedes, 1996).  
 
Innovation in Spain trails behind that of other European countries. Indeed, 
Spain is not involved in substantial pharmaceutical innovation. R&D expenditure has 
been equivalent to between 7% and 9% of domestic sales during the last two decades 
– appreciably lower than in other EU countries. Measuring innovation in terms of the 
proportion of new active ingredients introduced throughout the EU, we see that in 
2000 Spain accounted for 6.3%. Between 1985 and 1998, less than half of the new 
active ingredients marketed in Spain were classified as “innovative”. Therefore, the 
reimbursement system seems to have great difficulty in rewarding pharmaceutical 
innovation.   
 
The prescription market dominates pharmacists’ sales. On average, 
prescription drugs are three times more expensive than OTCs
3. The market share of 
prescription drugs is 85.5% of volume, and 92% of total sales; OTCs account for 
14.5% of volume and 8% of total sales. In the 1990s, there was some debate on the 
hypothetical effects of cost-containment policies (such as negative lists and posing 
additional barriers to obtaining prescriptions for less expensive drugs) on the 
development of the OTC market, since OTCs can be advertised in the media whereas 
prescription drugs cannot. However, the volume of OTCs remained stable; though 
expenditure increased by 7.54% between 1990 and 2001, the market for prescription 
drugs increased significantly in terms of both packs (1.54% annually) and monetary 
sales (by 10.7%)
4. OTCs refer mainly to dermatological drugs (11.87%), drugs to 
combat flu (17%), analgesics (19%), drugs for the respiratory system (16%), and 
laxatives and vitamins (6%). Not surprisingly, promotional campaigns focus on GPs 
                                                 
3 Average prices in 2001 were €6.07 for prescription drugs and €2.05 for OTCs.  




2.3 Licensing and market entry   
 
In 2000 Spain came second only to Germany in Europe as a whole in terms of 
different presentations of drugs. This is due to the still considerable number of copies 
in the market and the extension of generics, along with the entry of new drugs. In 
1995, there were 7,810 presentations marketed and by 2000 this number had risen to 
8,736. Of all authorised products in 2000, OTCs accounted for 6.4%, prescription 
drugs for 77% and hospitals for 17%. The share of total registered OTC products was 
between 15% and 20% in the late 1980s and had declined to 8% by the late 1990s 
(Table 1).    
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Overall, the average price of pharmaceuticals in Spain is low compared to 
other EU countries. Prices for relatively old drugs are significantly below the EU 
average in spite of the small market for generic drugs and, arguably, the existence of 
substantial parallel exports. That is, drug prices have fallen steeply over time. 
According to Farmaindustria (2003), while the average weighted price in the year 
2000 for new drugs (those on the market for less than 5 years) was €11.42, it was 
€8.11 for products authorised between 5 and 10 years previously, and older products – 
those on the market for more than 20 years – had an average price of €1.41
6. 
However, prices for new drugs are not much below 90% of the European average, and 
these are the drugs that account for the largest market share. Kanavos et al (2004) 
report that adjusting for DDD and product presentation, Spanish prices for new drugs 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Consumption of OTC drugs is related to self-medication, which is broadly considered by the MoH as 
a major problem – as 42% of the population recognises having a “private home pharmacy” – along 
with the 6% of prescription drugs that are dispensed without a prescription. 
5 Of total promotional expenses in 1997, 65% corresponded to personal promotion with GPs, though 
the figure fell to 54% by 2001. Visits to pharmacists represented 10-11% and visits to specialists 16-
17% of total promotional expenses. Congress organisation and public relations rose from 0.7% in 1997 
to 2.7% in 2001. Of OTC advertisements, 93% were TV commercials, 4% were placed in newspapers 
and 2% were on the radio.  
6 As a result of the existence of many “me-too” drugs in the Spanish market, 36% of total sales refers to 
products which have been 20 years or more in the market, although they represent only 12.6% of total 
sales. 
  8(e.g., statins) are in line with those in other EU countries whereas old drugs which are 
still under patent protection are far below the EU average.  
 
3. Pharmaceutical expenditure  
 
3.1 Trends in expenditure and expenditure determinants 
 
In the 1980s, the rise in health care spending was two points above 
pharmaceutical expenditure in nominal terms, but the trend was reversed in the 1990s. 
Total and public expenditure increased in the 1990s at an annual rate of above 10% 
(7% in real terms) and was most intense between 1987 and 1994. This feature could 
be explained by pressures from the industry and the passing of the 1986 National 
Health Act, which led to the creation of a universal health system, the integration of 
primary care physicians within the NHS – thus reducing barriers to access to the GP – 
and, arguably, the need to increase accountability in public health care spending. 
Indeed, since 1980, the share of pharmaceuticals in public health expenditure has 
remained between 16% and 23%
7 and OTC has risen to 4% (Table 2). Therefore, 
public expenditure is the leading driver of pharmaceutical spending. Indeed, NHS 
expenditure accounted for 68% of total pharmaceutical spending in 1986 and reached 
72% by the mid-1990s. In addition, real expenditure per capita increased at an annual 
8% in the 1980s and 6% in the 1990s.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In examining expenditure determinants, we should bear in mind that a small 
number of treatment groups represent a large share of the total spending. Recent 
evidence (Farmaindustria, 2002) suggests that products that have been on the market 
for less than 10 years (amounting to 37%) account for 65% of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Table 3 reveals that the mean price per prescription rose about 120% 
between 1990 and 2002 – equivalent to an annual accumulated growth rate of 6.75%. 
Simultaneously, in this period there was a notable increase in the number of 
                                                 
7 Compared with other EU countries, this is the highest share after Portugal (29.9%), though other 
OECD countries such as the Czech Republic (25.3% in 1997) and Hungary (22.6% in 1997) have 
similar health care expenditure distribution patterns. 
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prescription drugs might be associated with part of the “volume effect” on 
pharmaceutical growth. However, volume effects may be explained not only by better 
access to primary care but also by several factors such as the ageing process and the 
possible moral hazard associated with retired patients. Indeed, the number of 
prescriptions per inhabitant has risen steadily from 12.2 in 1980 to 14.4 in 2000, at an 
annual growth of 0.8%. Interestingly, in 2000 pensioners received an average of 39.6 
prescriptions, which might reveal some evidence of moral hazard as well as the effect 
of ageing.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Another important factor explaining trends in expenditure is cost sharing. 
Spain has experienced a gradual reduction in the effective co-payment rate from 15% 
in 1985 to 7% in 2002, responsible for an annual rise of 0.4% of the proportion of 
pharmaceuticals in public health care expenditure (Puig-Junoy, 2002). After Austria, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Spain is the EU country with the lowest 
level of cost sharing. Simultaneously, the share of pharmaceutical spending of the 
retired population (who amount to around 15% of the total population and are exempt 
from co-payments) practically doubled (from 39% to 72%). Table 4 shows that the 
share of retired consumers rose significantly from around 60% at the end of the 1980s 
to 72% in 2001. This partially reflects an increase in the number of pensioners, who 
spend nine times more than the average (Puig-Junoy, 2002). Whilst expenditure per 
active individual was below €60 in 2000, expenditure per pensioner in 2000 amounted 
to €140.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents a breakdown of public pharmaceutical expenditure 
determinants between 1991 and 2001. The change in real terms of public 
pharmaceutical spending was 74.7%, with an annual accumulated rate of 5.4%. In the 
annual accumulated growth rates, 58.1% refers to changes in both general/specific 
inflation and quality, 11.4% to ageing, 5% to the reduction in cost sharing and 4.6% 
to population growth. Overall, of each €100 in pharmaceutical expenditure increase 
  10between 1991 and 2001, €8.40 can be attributed to demographic patterns, €3.10 to a 
rise in prescription intensity, €28 to the change in general inflation, €29.70 to changes 
in specific inflation and quality and €2.60 to a reduction in cost sharing. 
 
From a policy perceptive, during the period examined, two delisting 
experiences (negative lists) have been tried. The first was conducted in 1993 by the 
Socialist government, and the second was implemented in 1998 by the conservative 
PP government. However, the effects of both plans were mainly short-term, and were 
unable to contain spending in the long run. This may have been due to the low 
therapeutic use of these drugs or to a strategic adaptation of prescription patterns to 
substitutes for which reimbursement was maintained. Other features to bear in mind 
are the reduction in the value added tax (VAT) applicable to medicines from 6% to 
3%, followed by an increase to 4% in 1995, and the low level of drug competition in 
Spain in spite of the widespread presence of drug copies. Certain problems persist in 
the area of the negotiation process with the industry, the pharmacist payment system 
and the traditionally marginal role of generic drugs.  
 
Finally, pharmaceuticals accounted for 59% of private health expenditure, 
which includes both co-payments and direct payment for prescription drugs and 
OTCs. In 1999, private pharmaceutical expenditure totalled €3,107 million, 
equivalent to €79.35 per capita. Given the decreasing role of co-payments, it might be 
argued that relative to other countries there is scope for reform in the cost sharing of 
pharmaceuticals.    
 
3.2 Price composition   
 
Prices in Spain are subject to government authorisation. In the 1990s price 
reductions were frequently used as a “once-for-ever” tool to contain costs. Indeed, the 
price composition of pharmaceuticals varied slightly from 1986 to 2000 (Table 5). In 
the 1990s, nominal prices for drugs fell due to a reduction in taxes, a significant 
decline in wholesalers’ margins and a slight decline in pharmacists’ retail margins. 
The ratio between retail price and ex-factory price fell from 1.7:1 in 1986 to 1.6:1 in 
2000.  
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The trends in prices can be explained by the agreements between the MoH and 
the pharmaceutical industry in 1993, which led to a 3% reduction in 1993 and were 
extended over two periods covering 1994-1997 and 1998-1999. In 1999 a 6% price 
reduction was imposed. The government estimated the overall effect to be a cost 
reduction of €1,100 million from 1997 to 2000.  
 
3.3 Devolution and regional heterogeneity 
 
Spain’s Autonomous Communities (ACs) have gradually become key agents 
in pharmaceutical policy, especially since the completion of the decentralisation 
process in 2002, though the regulation decisions are still made at State level. Their 
responsibilities cover the promotion of prescribing guidelines, inspection and 
regulation of clinical trials, quality control and information and communication 
policies. ACs also run cost-containment initiatives through the control of prescription 
and hospital health care. After the completion of the devolution process in 2002, 
coordination is now the responsibility of the Interregional Council, which is formed 
by representatives of each AC through specific commissions dedicated to 
pharmaceutical policy. However, the AC governments’ attempts to increase their role 
in pharmaceutical policy have not been successful, as the new Cohesion and Quality 
Act (passed in 2003) establishes that the central State maintains full responsibility for 
the authorisation, registry, pricing and public financing of drugs, along with their 
safety and control. The recent proposals of some regional health services (Andalusia, 
Canaries and Catalonia) point to the need to increase regional responsibility for 
pharmaceutical policy. They defend the principle whereby “those who pay should 
decide”, that is, those paying for health care should have some capacity to influence 
reimbursement, licensing and pricing decisions. Therefore, devolution has brought a 
new dynamism to pharmaceutical policy. 
 
From 1981 to 1997 seven ACs took on health care responsibilities, thus taking 
charge of 60% of total public health expenditure. Up to 1997 pharmaceutical 
expenditure grew at similar rates in these communities (12-13%), but in 1993, the rate 
of increase began to fall, from 7.9% to 5.5% in 1997. Among the ACs, Andalusia and 
  12Navarre had the lowest growth rates in the 1990s, while Galicia and Valencia had the 
highest ones. Spending growth from 1995 to 2000 was similar across ACs in both 
total expenditure and expenditure per capita. However, there is evidence of significant 
regional heterogeneity in the share of pharmaceutical expenditure in total regional 
health care budgets
8. Prescription rates and values present major regional variations. 
According to the data from the Directorate-General of Pharmacy (2003) in 2001 the 
Spanish average for prescriptions was 1.45 per capita, the highest being 1.79 in 
Valencia and the lowest 1.36 in the Basque Country. In 2002, the Balearics was the 
AC with the lowest prescription rate per capita and Valencia the one with the highest. 
Not surprisingly, regional heterogeneity decreased when the data are standardised by 
age and gender, but still Valencia and Castile-Leon, followed by Murcia and 
Andalusia, display the highest number of prescriptions per inhabitant.  
 
3.4 Distribution and dispensation of drugs 
 
The distribution of drugs is organised mainly by wholesalers. According to 
Farmaindustria (2002), wholesalers distribute 77% of all drugs sold, hospitals 19% 
and the rest are distributed directly to retailers
9 (3%) and to governmental agencies 
(1%). The retailers (pharmacists) are independently authorised and are subject to strict 
regulation. Indeed, the regulation of pharmacists is a key issue in Spain. Prescription 
drugs are only dispensed in pharmacies, though retailers have certain freedom as 
regards opening times. Unlike in other EU countries, pharmacy owners in Spain must 
have a university degree in Pharmacy and the location of pharmacies must observe 
certain rules of geographic competition; for example, the number of pharmacies and 
the distance between them is laid down legally.  
 
Spain experienced a notable rise in pharmacist density during the 1990s 
resulting from a rise in the number of pharmacies. In the 1990s the number of 
pharmacies increased by 9%, and sales by 44% (Table 6). The number of pharmacies 
operating in Spain in 2001 amounted to 19,768. However, there is some regional 
                                                 
8 In Catalonia, pharmaceutical expenditure accounted for 24% of public health expenditure in 2001. 
Recent data suggest that the variation coefficient has fallen from 0.16 in 2001 to 0.15 in 2002. 
9 Some 98% of drugs distributed by wholesalers go to retailers and 2% to hospitals. In addition, 99% of 
drugs dispensed by retailers go to patients. 
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10. In 1997 the minimum number of inhabitants 
required to authorise a new pharmacy was reduced, though again, there are certain 
differences between ACs (Table 6). In Navarre, for instance, the act passed in 2000 
introduced decentralisation and restricted the number of pharmacies subject to NHS 
reimbursement but allows the creation of new pharmacies. Furthermore, different 
regional health services have adopted different criteria for opening hours in order to 
improve access to drugs. While the rest of the country still has a limit on the number 
of authorised pharmacies, in Navarre there is no restriction on opening a new 
pharmacy unless the maximum number of one pharmacy for each 700 inhabitants is 
exceeded. This opens the door to the liberalisation of pharmacies, since the 1997 act 
regulating the services of pharmacists established a benchmark number of 2,800 
inhabitants per pharmacy.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The number of wholesalers hardly changed during the 1990s. About one 
hundred wholesalers operate in the pharmaceutical distribution market. In 2000 Spain 
had 99 pharmaceutical wholesalers, the highest number in Europe after Greece (124) 
and Italy (193). Interestingly, Spain has 191 storage facilities for drugs, the highest 
after France (193) and Italy (283).  
 
4. Demand-side policies 
 
4.1 Information policies 
 
One of the bases of the health policy reforms initiated in the 1990s was the 
implementation of information policies and pharmacological education campaigns for 
GPs and consumers. The Pharmaceuticals Act of 1990 spurred the introduction of 
effective procedures for informing primary care physicians of the costs of drugs 
prescribed and for adjusting pharmaceutical prices to production costs. Obviously, it 
is highly important to inform providers and patients of their health care costs; 
                                                 
10 While in Extremadura and Castile-Leon there is a pharmacy for every 1,600 inhabitants, in the 
Basque Country and the Canary Islands there is one for each 2,600 inhabitants; the variation coefficient 
for all ACs in 2000 was 0.16. 
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physicians to promote “rational prescribing”. More recently, some regional health 
services have introduced individual smart cards, which have become compulsory for 
obtaining prescription drugs in pharmacies and allow utilisation, prescription reviews 
and a more efficient ex-ante control of prescriptions. In Catalonia, the creation of 
primary care pharmacies provides some guarantee that physicians follow official 
prescribing guidelines.   
 
4.2 Cost sharing 
 
One plausible demand-side explanation of pharmaceutical expenditure is the 
evolution of cost sharing. As noted in Section 3, during the two decades leading up to 
the year 2000 the effective co-payment rate was halved. This is often pinpointed as a 
plausible explanation of the rise in expenditure. The reduction in effective co-
payments might be explained by the increasing ageing process and by the fact that 
pensioners often obtain prescriptions for other household members who are not 
exempt from co-payments. It is calculated that a 10% increase in the co-payment rate 
would reduce spending by 2.2% (Puig-Junoy, 2002).   
 
Interestingly, one part of the population (civil servants) who are covered by a 
special insurance scheme (known as MUFACE) and who are obliged to make lower 
co-payments (30%) than the general population spend less than those included in the 
NHS. This finding suggests the co-existence of a level of fraud and to some extent 
overconsumption (the moral hazard effect) in the demand for pharmaceuticals in 
Spain. Additional evidence of moral hazard is found when comparing the effective 
co-payment of MUFACE beneficiaries and that found in the NHS. Surprisingly, 
MUFACE’s effective co-payment rate remained stable during the 1990s at 21.7%, 
whereas for those covered by the general NHS it fell from 15% in 1985 to 9.1% in 
1995, and finally to 7.1% in 2000 (Puig-Junoy, 2004).  
 
5. Provider regulation and policy 
 
  155.1 Prescription policies and clinical variability 
 
One of the most often quoted tools for cost containment is based on the setting 
of incentives to moderate demand. Spain is currently experimenting with budgets and 
pecuniary incentives for GPs to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure. With the passing 
of the General Health Act in 1986, GPs became integrated into the public network. 
The act improved the general public’s access to primary care. However, it has also led 
to an increase in the number of visits to the GP, a development that is likely to have 
some influence on the number of prescriptions. Furthermore, GPs are paid a fixed 
salary and have had little incentive to prescribe efficiently, and it was not until the 
1990s that some contracts with providers included pharmaceutical expenditure on 
prescriptions. In Navarre in 1998 and in Catalonia in 1999, monetary incentives were 
introduced to encourage primary care physicians to prescribe drugs with high 
therapeutic utility and generics, and GPs were subjected to stricter control over both 
efficiency and quality. The use of budgets is being progressively implemented to 
promote generics, although this measure might act as an incentive to doctors merely 
to add generics to the prescription list rather than to substitute original products. 
Furthermore, in 1995 the figure of the primary care pharmacist was created to control 
prescription patterns and to advise on the most suitable pharmaceutical treatment
11.  
 
As noted above, the largest rise in the 1990s was in cost per prescription, 
indicating that the group of drugs in the NHS reimbursement system were more 
expensive. Lack of cost-awareness on the part of physicians might have some 
influence in fostering moral hazard. Recent policies have focused on providing 
physicians with information on the price variability of different drugs and on 
complementing the information on new drugs provided by the industry. Some studies 
have pointed out that physicians are unaware of the costs of drugs prescribed: in an 
opinion survey Alastrué and Meneu (1998) found that only 40.9% of physicians were 
aware of the exact price of drugs prescribed
12. Evidence from Catalonia shows that in 
1995, 25% of prescriptions were regarded as being induced and of low intrinsic 
                                                 
11 The information system to be developed in the near future for a national prescription monitoring 
system – through the so-called Independent Prescription Identification Terminal – might be used to 
identify and warn physicians who are judged to be overprescribing. 
12 Costs not only refer to the selling price but to possible administration costs, pharmaceutical security 
costs and follow-up, possible adverse effects and other indirect costs. 
  16therapeutic value. Caminal et al (1999) found that 40% of antibiotic treatments were 
prescribed to patients who did not need them, and that 53% of those individuals who 
required antibiotics used them inappropriately. The effect of prescription errors, 
diverse interactions, treatment resistance and adverse effects have been estimated to 
increase hospital morbidity and health care utilisation by 10% (Lobato et al, 2000).  
 
Recent estimates (2002) on the quality of pharmaceutical care are provided by 
the Spanish Hospital Pharmacy Society (Sociedad Española de Farmacia 
Hospitalaria or SEFH). They suggest that 13% of all medication in hospital care was 
inappropriate. Measures to reduce errors include avoiding giving similar names to 
different products, avoiding verbal prescriptions and ensuring greater involvement of 
hospital pharmacists in the process. In order to control quality of prescription, both 
regional governments and the central government impose what is known as the 
inspection visa, i.e., ex-ante authorisation for prescribed drugs. This is intended to 
improve the use of certain innovative drugs that are subject to special medical control, 
but in practice it is employed as a toll to contain pharmaceutical expenditure.  
 
A recent policy proposal to promote the use of generics is prescription by 
active ingredient (henceforth PAI). This proposal was launched in Andalusia and 
followed by Extremadura, Madrid, Aragon, Castile-Leon and Cantabria. The use of 
PAI has increased significantly in Andalusia since its implementation in September 
2001, and within roughly a year the Andalusian health system had saved around €9.88 
million. The share of drugs in the PAI system easily exceeded the share stipulated for 
2001. This proposal represents a radical change in the philosophy of the prescription 
system in the NHS. It has been well accepted by patients and is expected to affect 
35% of Andalusian pharmaceutical spending. The result is that the average 
expenditure is €11.20 per prescription, around 1% below the Spanish average.  
 
5.2 How pharmacists are paid 
 
The pharmacists’ payment system has traditionally been based on a fixed 
proportional mark-up of the consumer price before tax. This system offers incentives 
to increase revenues by selling more expensive drugs – and the same applies to 
distributors. This might explain the gradual move towards the dispensation of new, 
  17more expensive drugs. The system has often been criticised as providing protective 
measures that confer illegitimate – though legal – market power and excessive 
revenues taking into account the dispensation costs and the stock of capital invested.  
 
In 1997, mark-ups were established at 11% for wholesalers and 27.9% for 
pharmacies. A further unilateral reduction in margins for wholesalers was established 
at 9.6% in 1999, although accompanied with mild incentives to introduce generics. 
This led to an additional reform in 2000 that set a decreasing mark-up with increasing 
product price by introducing a monetary cap of €78.34 (ex-factory price) and 
increasing the mark-up for generics by 5.1%. This meant that drugs priced above 
€78.34 displayed a wholesaler’s margin that remained at 9.6%, a retailer’s margin for 
generics of 33%, and 27.9% for originals and copies. Furthermore, with drugs priced 
above €78.34 the wholesaler’s margin was set at €8.54 per pack and the retailer’s 
margin €33.54 per pack. Finally, a proportional discount scale was introduced for 
retail sales.  
 
The pharmaceutical reimbursement reform may have moderately increased the 
penetration of generics, but because some generics are almost the same price as 
original products, this provided an incentive to dispense highly priced generics which 
could in turn have created additional distortions into the market. Vaquero (2003) 
reported that 76% out of all substituted prescriptions of omeoprazole 20 mg were 
expensive generics. However, substantial savings may be achieved because the 
average mark-up decreases with the volume of sales. Thus, overall, the evidence 
suggests that pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 7.43% in 2000, while without 
this change it would have increased by 8.47% (Puig-Junoy, 2004). Interestingly, the 
greater savings were in ACs with the highest density of pharmacists (Puig-Junoy and 
Llop, 2004).  
 
Some one-off attempts have been made to reduce pharmacists’ margins, but 
they have had little impact on total expenditure. Generally speaking the pharmacist 
payment system has not produced incentives to dispense low-priced drugs. Nor does it 
provide “equal treatment”, given the significant heterogeneity of pharmacists in terms 
of costs, location, population, and so on. 
    
  185.3 Payment and reimbursement of drugs consumed in hospitals 
 
Medicines consumed in public hospitals are fully reimbursed by the NHS and 
rank second among hospital outlays. Drug use normally follows a prescribing protocol 
that is determined periodically by a “multidisciplinary committee on pharmaceutical 
and therapeutic agents”. Furthermore, the Interministerial Commission on Drug Prices 
determines maximum prices of drugs supplied to hospitals. Hospitals normally work 
on an annual budget for drugs which is updated on a monthly basis, and physicians 
may be required to justify expenditures that exceed those defined in the prescribing 
protocols. The specialist staff at the hospital pharmacy purchase drugs directly from 
the manufacturers on a tender basis – and occasionally from drug distributors – and 
are also responsible for dispensing and further auditing.  
 
5.4 Delisting and negative lists 
 
The 1990 Pharmaceuticals Act laid down that drugs may be delisted when 
other equally effective drugs at a lower price or lower treatment cost were available, 
or more generally in order to control pharmaceutical expenditure. The aim of 
promoting a more “rational use” of drugs led to the approval of Royal Decree 
83/1993, which regulated the first experiment with negative lists. Indeed, the 
exclusion decision aimed to take into account the specific needs and severity of 
certain population groups. Reimbursement was abolished for 1,692 products (e.g., 
food supplements, anti-obesity drugs, drugs for dermatological syndromes and drugs 
for minor symptoms). However, no entire group was delisted. Thus, as expected, this 
led to the substitution of one set of drugs for another within the same group. The 
second negative list was introduced in 1998 (Royal Decree 1663/1998), which 
excluded 834 additional drugs used mostly to cure minor symptoms, although certain 
exceptions were explicitly established according to the patient’s severity.  
 
Nevertheless, negative lists were never compiled with sufficient care. Indeed, 
some drugs were not excluded in spite of their limited social utility because of their 
popularity among pensioners. Examining the quality and costs of publicly financed 
pharmaceutical supply, Martin et al (2003) highlighted a pattern towards an increase 
in the intrinsic value of single component pharmaceuticals resulting from the 
  19implementation of a 1993 programme which undertook a selective revision of all 
drugs even if it meant rising costs. The other problem is the persistence of “me-toos”. 
There is a disproportion between the number of pharmaceutical products and the 
number of active ingredients registered, and the inclusion of innovative active 
ingredients is minimal. Products included in the 1993 programme had been on the 
market for 10.9 years whereas those included in the 1998 plan had been on the market 
for 20.1 years. Furthermore, by 2002, 40% of the medicines delisted in 1990 had 
subsequently disappeared from the market, together with 25% of those excluded in 
1998 (Martin et al, 2002).  
 
Another significant issue was the public’s negative response to these 
measures. Not surprisingly, 57% of the Spanish population disapproved of the first 
programme and the second led to controversy on a political level. Andalusia, an 
Autonomous Community governed by the Socialists, and Navarre, ruled by a minority 
conservative party (PP) government, refused to apply the plan and approved a budget 
increase to cover delisted drugs. Parallel to the political controversy, the National 
Commission for the Rational Use of Drugs, the government body created in 1992 to 
provide expert advice on selective financing, was inoperative from the outset. And in 
addition to the difficulties involved in applying government policy, the 
pharmaceutical industry lobbied to ensure that certain drugs were not delisted
13. In 
fact, in general terms the pharmaceutical industry benefited from the shift in 
reimbursement from old to new products.  
 
Although selective financing experiences also had therapeutic aims, they were 
mainly envisaged as cost-containment tools. The 1993 plan excluded approximately a 
fifth of all drugs supplied, on the whole inexpensive products whose prices amounted 
to 23% of the average. In fact exclusion had little or no influence on expenditure: at 
best it was merely transitory. This was even more the case of the second plan, which 
was expected to reduce spending by €210.4 million. The result was that after the first 
programme, between 1994 and 1998, public pharmaceutical expenditure grew at a 
rate of 10%, and at a rate of 9% from 1998 to 2000. However, it is difficult to 
                                                 
13 With the support of the government of Catalonia – at that time ruled by nationalists – who argued 
that they were defending Catalan industry. 
  20evaluate the effects of these policies as they were combined with other features such 
as price reduction and political pressure to reduce prescriptions.  
 
5.5 Promotion of generic penetration 
 
The market for generic drugs in Spain has been practically inexistent in the 
last two decades, as up until 1992 Spain only recognised process (rather than product) 
patenting
14. The 1990 Pharmaceuticals Act was modified by the 13/1996 General 
Budget Act and the 66/1997 Regulation Act, which opened the door to the 
introduction of generic drugs
15. The first generic brands were registered for 
commercial distribution in July 1997 and generic penetration has risen steadily 
(although leisurely) ever since to meet the EU standards (that is, 15% of the total 
market). In 2000, generics accounted for 3% of total NHS sales and had increased to 
6.4% by 2003. However, 75% of generic consumption was concentrated in four 
products, and there was significant regional heterogeneity. Whereas 12-15% of total 
prescriptions (8-10% of sales) in Madrid and Catalonia corresponded to generics, in 
Galicia the figure was less than 3% (Asociación Española de Productores de 
Genéricos, 2002).  
 
Measures have been introduced to promote what is known as “generics 
culture”. They take the form of favouring medical advertising of generic drugs; full 
subsidies; and dispensing only generics when the prescription is based on an active 
ingredient. Since the approval of the Cohesion and Quality Act, pharmacists are 
supposed to play a wider role in the promotion of a rational use of drugs by working 
in collaboration with other health professionals to promote generics. Currently, only 
2.83% of the drugs that can be substituted by generics have actually been replaced 
and savings deriving from their use are contentious.  
                                                 
14 In Spain three distinct types of pharmaceutical products coexist: original products under patent 
(which might be marketed either by the patent holder or a licensee), generic drugs, and drug copies 
when the patent has not yet expired (Lobo, 1997). However, the market penetration of copies is 
expected to decline gradually until 2012. 
15 A generic drug is defined as being interchangeable with the original product; thus, proof is required 
of its “bioequivalence”, which ensures the same quality, safety and efficacy as the original product. In 
addition, all generic drugs are distinguished from those of copy licensees by containing the 
abbreviation EFG in its label. Initially, authorisation was subject to previous authorisation in other EU 
countries or a ten-year period whereby its clinical use was proven.  
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5.6 The Spanish reference price system 
 
Although Spain is a low-price country with limited generic penetration, the 
reference pricing (RP) system was introduced in December 2000 and reformed in 
2003. This system was applied to off-patent drugs with the same active ingredient (a 
situation known as bioequivalence, defined by the Spanish Agency for 
Pharmaceuticals)
16. A total of 114 homogeneous therapeutic drug ceilings were 
designed, each including at least one equivalent generic product. The reference price 
(RP) for each ceiling and the composition of the set of drugs included was determined 
by the MoH and revised in December 2000 in conjunction with a commission of the 
Ministry of Finance. Reference prices were calculated until January 2004 as the 
weighted average sale price of a minimum set of drugs accounting for at least 20% of 
each market.  
 
Three restrictions were imposed in the calculation of the RP. First, the RP 
should always exceed the minimum price of the drug category. Second, the minimum 
difference between the RP and the highest-priced drug was to be 10%, and finally, the 
maximum difference from the lowest-priced drug was to be 50%. The total of 590 
drugs included in the new system account for 10% of pharmaceutical expenditure and 
14.6% of the market, of which slightly more than half (53%) are generics. Prices have 
been examined for 98 homogeneous groups. Of these, in 10 the reference price was 
the minimum price, but in 64 it was only 10% lower than the highest price, in 13 
groups the price was 10-20% lower than the highest price, in 9 groups it was 20-30% 
lower and in 2 groups 30-50% lower. In 2002, 28 new homogeneous groups were 
added, comprising 113 products.  
 
The main problem of RP is its limited application to a small proportion of the 
market. In fact, official savings amounted to 1.2% of total public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals in 2001 and to 2% in 2002. However, saving estimates include 
compulsory price reductions imposed in conjunction with RP, some of which 
                                                 
16 All the pharmaceutical products included in the same homogeneous group (identical reference price) 
are bioequivalent, and at least one of them has to be a generic product. This system was updated each 
year and it was eventually extended to most out-of-patent medicines. 
  22correspond to copies that have not demonstrated bioequivalence
17. In 2001, in order to 
reinforce RP and hypothetically to improve competition, the government imposed a 
15% compulsory reduction in market prices for 5 ingredients
18. However, due to the 
small number of generic competitors in Spain, this may lead to the RP being fixed 
above the marginal cost, and as a result it might act against competition. In 2001, 
44.7% of products were priced at the reference level and only 4 out of 228 were 
priced above it. However, it has not been effective in bringing down the price of 
products initially priced below the reference level (Puig-Junoy, 2002). The net result 
of a year of reference pricing combined with other measures was an appreciable 
reduction in pharmaceutical prices during 2001 – prices rose by 1.9%, some way 
below the general price index (2.7%). However, rather than declining, expenditure 
rose by 7.93% in 2001.  
 
A radical change in this generic reference pricing system was introduced by 
the Cohesion and Quality Act 16/2003 (henceforth CQA). The details for the 
implementation of the new approach were actively debated in the Spanish health 
policy arena until the act’s final approval in October 2003 (SCO/2958/2003, 23 
October). The CQA explicitly excludes patented products from RP and all 
presentations of the same active ingredient are grouped together in order to determine 
a reference price. The only condition for each “group” is that they have to contain at 
least one generic product
19. The reference price is calculated as the average of the 
three lowest costs per day of treatment for each form of administration of an active 
ingredient, according to its defined daily dose. In addition, different companies must 
produce the three lowest-cost medicines. In order to guarantee that all medicines 
under this system are supplied to pharmacies, the medicines selected to establish the 
reference level (those with the three lowest treatment costs per day) must not have an 
ex-factory price lower than €2. The minimum reference price (consumer price) for 
                                                 
17 Other limitations that might have been caused by reference pricing are higher prices for new drugs, 
the switch to non-referenced drugs and a possible delay in launching products. 
18 Compulsory reduction affected the price of products whose price was 15% higher than the average of 
the three least expensive ones in the same homogeneous group. This evidence confirms that some 
manufacturers kept the price above the PR.  
19 New pharmaceutical forms are excluded from the reference pricing system. Paediatric forms of the 
active ingredients under the reference pricing system are considered as a separate “group” in order to 
calculate the reference price. A separate “group” may also be established when there is a significantly 
different dose for a specific indication of an active ingredient. 
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ex-factory price of €2.  
 
The new regulation considers three cases for pharmacy substitution when the 
physician has prescribed a commercial brand name (as opposed to the name of the 
active ingredient). If the prescription price is equal to or lower than the reference 
price, the pharmacist has to dispense the prescribed medicine. If the prescription price 
exceeds the reference price and there are other generic products in the same “group”, 
the pharmacist has to dispense the lowest-priced generic in the same “group”. Finally, 
if the prescription price is higher than the reference price but there is no other generic 
product, the pharmacist has to dispense the prescribed medicine but at the reference 
price level




Spanish producers of generics objected strongly to this radical reform of the 
reference pricing system because the reform implies a sudden, large-scale reduction of 
consumer prices for a significant part of the generic products in the market (an 
average 20% decrease). Some companies are facing an expected decline in revenues 
of 40 to 70%. Therefore, this policy works against the promotion of generics in Spain, 
which have not increased their market share since the introduction of the reference 
pricing system. Consequently, generic producers will not be able to invest in the 
production of new active ingredients that will be out-of-patent in the coming years. 
The expected result will be a reduction in price competition in the out-of-patent 
market and higher prices being paid by the consumer and public insurers in the near 
future. 
                                                 
20 When the prescription has been written using the name of the active ingredient, the pharmacist has to 
dispense the lowest-priced generic medicine in the same equivalent “group”. If there is no such generic 
in the “group”, the pharmacist has to dispense the brand name medicine at the reference price level. 
21 The Spanish Economic and Social Council previously supported reference pricing, but recently it 
issued a very critical report on the new reform of this system. Its main objections were the fact that the 
products used to calculate the new reference pricing level have to be registered products but they are 
sometimes not on the market. This may result in supply shortages for some active ingredients because 
no firms price their products at the reference level. Additional concerns were heterogeneity in grouping 
medicines with different numbers of units, dosage and form of presentation, and the possible bias 
resulting from the use of defined daily doses in the calculation of prices. Finally, compulsory 
substitution by the pharmacist when a product with a price above the reference price is prescribed 
means that public financing of these products is excluded. 
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According to a study undertaken by the Official Association of Pharmacists of 
Valencia and the National Pharmaceutical Centre Foundation, the new reference 
pricing system is estimated to bring savings of about €623.3 million in retail sales, a 
reduction of 24.23% of the market of these active ingredients and 5.2% of the total 
prescription market. This figure emerges from the new formula for calculating the 
reference price (the average cost of the three least expensive treatments). The measure 
has been criticised as it weakens the incentives of the industry to provide discounts 
and promote generic drugs. As a result of pressure from manufacturers a price limit of 
€2 has been introduced. In addition, the CQA makes substitution compulsory when 
the drug exceeds the reference price. Only when the generic drugs are not in stock can 
pharmacists dispense the prescribed drug without substitution.     
 
Generally speaking, the reform of the reference pricing system has made the 
RP a sort of maximum reimbursement price that a drug may have without being 
excluded from the list of publicly financed medicines
22. Patient choice has been 
reduced if the avoidable co-payment for a medicine priced above the reference level is 
removed by compulsory substitution by the lowest-priced generic. The impact of this 
measure on price competition in the market of out-of-patent medicines in Spain is not 
clear. Although in the past the reference prices set were clearly above the marginal 
cost, price competition between generics producers took the form of offering 
competitive discounts to pharmacies rather than reducing consumer prices. The result 
was that price competition did not lead to reduced public expenditure, and that having 
a lower price than other generic competitors did not mean a competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, the new method of reference price calculation will provide incentives to 
increase consumption in terms of the number of defined daily doses. The reason is 
that the new method assumes linearity in the relationship between number of units 
and dosage of the active ingredient and price, and so the marginal benefit will be 
higher for presentations of the active ingredient with a higher number of units and 
dosages. 
                                                 
22 In addition, the use of defined daily doses to fix the reference price for an active ingredient, contrary 
to the recommendations of the WHO, biases prices in favour of presentations with higher dosages and 
higher numbers of units. In fact, the lower ex-factory price limit of €2 will only be effective in very few 
cases because the reference level is mainly fixed using those presentations with a higher number of 
units and dosage of the same active ingredient. 
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The introduction of the RP system presents some interesting regional policy 
initiatives due to the major role of the ACs in monitoring health policy. In September 
2001 the Andalusian health service introduced a new procurement mechanism that 
competes with the RP system applied nationwide. The Andalusian RP system defined 
a reimbursement system based on the active ingredient when more than two products 
in the market were sold at different prices. The system extends to the ten top-selling 
products, whereas the nationwide RP system covered only two of them at that time. 
The system covers 239 active ingredients and 591 homogeneous groups involving 
2,900 products that account for 35% of prescriptions. The novelty of the system is that 
prescriptions are not made under the name of the product but under the composition 
of the active ingredient. The RP is determined by the highest price of the two lowest-
priced products for each active ingredient and is updated every 6 months. 
Interestingly, the average Andalusian RP was 17% lower than the national one in 
2001 (Puig-Junoy, 2004). 
 
6. Industrial policy and the negotiation process 
 
6.1 The Spanish pricing policy  
 
Manufacturers negotiate to set the terms of pricing and reimbursement. The 
Spanish NHS price regulation for reimbursed drugs relies on controlling prices 
product by product on the basis of a cost-plus regime
23 whereby the agreed price is 
expected to provide a profit in the range of 12-18% of the invested capital (Badia and 
Magaz, 2002; Nonell and Borrell, 2001). If sales exceed the predicted volume, then 
prices are lowered to adjust profits to within the acceptable range. However, in 
determining prices, there are some additional factors to bear in mind, such as 
therapeutic innovation, scope of R&D, licensing agreements, and especially prices 
elsewhere, including EU countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France and 
Italy. Finally, since 1998 prices of non-reimbursed products have not been controlled, 
though it is rare for a new product to be launched without being included on the NHS 
reimbursement list.   
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Because price regulation has tended to freeze prices and leads to a decreasing 
pattern over time in real terms, the market share for old drugs is considerably smaller 
than that of expensive new ones. Indeed, the price regulation system might itself 
explain the fact that prices in Spain are lower than in other EU countries. The 
dynamics of the introduction of new, more expensive products may have helped to 
increase the cost per prescription. According to Danzon and Chao (2000), countries 
that regulate prices strictly and have a weak generic penetration show lower prices for 
new drugs, but consumption is then re-directed towards new and relatively new 
products.     
 
One of the criticisms of the way the Spanish Agency for Pharmaceuticals sets 
the prices for new drugs is that the procedure is excessively secretive. The current 
system does not provide incentives to reduce prices. In addition, asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the manufacturer may lead to a significant rise 
in transaction costs. The recently passed Cohesion and Quality Act (2003) establishes 
that pharmaceutical pricing will remain the responsibility of the State; the 
Interregional Council will have a more important role but the vote of each AC will 
have the same weight, and this in turn reduces flexibility for accommodating policy 
diversity across heterogeneous ACs. Furthermore, cost-containment policies in the 
late 1990s led to considerable market intervention which placed excessive emphasis 
on reducing prices at the expense of other, possibly more important, expenditure 
determinants.  
 
However, the primary concern, which reflects the lack of coherence of 
pharmaceutical policy, is that the debate remains limited to the role of prices rather 
than addressing the real problem, which, since the early 1990s, has been volume.   
 
6.2 The government-industry negotiation process  
 
The government implements its pharmaceutical expenditure and pricing policy 
in Spain through periodic negotiations with Farmaindustria (the pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                                            
23 This includes production costs, promotional costs up to 16%, R&D, administrative and general costs 
  27industry’s representative body) on the basis of balancing industrial innovation targets 
with health policy goals. During the last two decades, agreements with the 
pharmaceutical industry have been the most common mechanisms for setting limits to 
expenditure increases. However, most of the agreements date from the 1990s; during 
the 1980s the Socialist government did not believe that negotiations with the industry 
would be helpful as they were envisaged as a way of granting privileges and thus 
increasing the power of the industry. 
 
During the 1980s, an agreement on discounts was reached in 1983, and an 
agreement that laid down the economic and technical conditions by which 
pharmaceutical products could be included within the public reimbursement system 
was reached in 1986 (Chaqués, 1999). It was renewed in 1989. Between 1993 and 
1999 four agreements were signed. The first agreement affected discounts to 
pharmacies and the introduction of selective financing in 1993. The next one was 
signed in 1995 to ensure that pharmaceutical expenditure growth would be in line 
with GDP growth, a 3% reduction in prices and a 1% discount in hospital provision; 
in exchange, it was agreed that policy on generics should not affect the legitimate 
interests of manufacturers and that the supply of reimbursed drugs should not be 
modified. In 1996, a new agreement was signed by the conservative PP government, 
which led to a 3% reduction in prices; it was guaranteed that net spending growth 
would remain below 6.6% (Chaqués, 1999) and a 4% rebate was established on ex-
factory prices. In addition, discounts were linked to consumption patterns so that an 
increasing scale of discounts was introduced when sales of publicly funded drugs 
increased by more than 2.6%
24. Among the methods often used to obtain funds from 
the industry is what is known as repayment funds, which are often envisaged as an 
“unsolicited tax” for financing NHS expenditure. In 1996 the industry agreed to 
provide €177.3 million, a figure which rose to €390.7 million in 1998. 
 
In 1998 an additional agreement was signed leading to the creation of a 
general (repayment) fund to finance health care deficits resulting from drugs 
consumed under NHS prescriptions. Discounts disappeared and the 3% price 
reduction was maintained. In 1998 repayments totalled €235.3 million – equivalent to 
                                                                                                                                            
and finally a margin computed on the basis of projected sales volume.  
  284.1% of public pharmaceutical expenditure. However, some firms, among them firms 
that were not members of Farmaindustria, did not sign the repayment and started 
negotiations with regional governments and hospitals. The agreement was finally 
terminated in June 1999 due to disagreements on the introduction of the reference 
price system, and in November the government reacted with the imposition of a 
compulsory, unilateral 6% price reduction.  
 
In 2001 a new three-year agreement known as the Stability Pact was signed. 
The agreement reduced the traditional uncertainty and allowed some prediction of 
future expenses. The MoH undertook not to impose unilateral price reductions and, in 
exchange, the industry pledged to become involved in the promotion of generic drugs, 
the introduction of new homogeneous groups into the RP system and the annual 
revision of RP. The agreed public expenditure reduction could not be more than 
€105.18 million and in exchange the government agreed to soften the effect of parallel 
trade on the industry, extend protection for data included in the official drug registry, 
and implement tax reductions for R&D expenses. Farmaindustria agreed to finance a 
publicly managed fund amounting to €60.1 million for 2002 and 2003 which could be 
increased according to the annual increase in pharmaceutical expenditure with a cap 
of €99.17 million.  
 
Contributions to the fund depend on nominal GDP growth and can be revised 
if drug prescription sales increase the maximum fixed level by more than 3% 
annually. Interestingly, this agreement aimed to include incentives to restrict sales. 
However, some issues remain unsolved, such as the fact that repayments will be lower 
under this agreement in monetary terms or that tax deductions might reduce the 
effective amount of resources allocated to the fund. Finally, there might be problems 
in allocating repayments regionally; Andalusia, for instance, has refused to accept the 
agreement with the industry. Funds are supposed to be distributed by the Interregional 
Council assigned to laboratories to promote innovation. 
 
6.3 Parallel Trade 
 
                                                                                                                                            
24 The maximum marginal discount could not be set above the gross profit margin.  
  29Spain is one of Europe’s leading parallel exporters of drugs. However, 
empirical evidence from Spanish sources on the volume of parallel traded drugs is 
scarce. Kanavos et al (2004) provide a stakeholder analysis on parallel trade in the 
European Union countries. It is interesting to note that Spain is frequently either the 
last or the second last country for some relatively new drugs, and together with 
Greece and Italy is responsible for a large share of parallel exports to other EU 
countries such as the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian countries.   
 
The conservative PP government initiated a plan aimed at abolishing parallel 
trade. In 1999, the government introduced a dual pricing system that allowed the 
maintenance of low pricing in Spain and a subsequent higher price for products that 
were to be exported elsewhere. This move led to legal action by the European 
Commission. More recently, in May 2003, the MoH presented a proposal (Decree 
725/2003 modifying Article 100 of the Pharmaceuticals Act) aimed at containing 
parallel trade. This law essentially introduced the requirement for wholesalers to 
provide information to manufacturers on the destination of the drugs purchased, 
following the move by Glaxo to set up double pricing for drugs that are bought for 
later sale in other EU countries.  
 
According to this initiative, manufacturers are obliged to sell at the fixed 
prices if these drugs are to be sold within the NHS channels but not if they are to be 
sold in other countries. However, the Competition Defence Court upheld an objection 
from the wholesalers’ association Fedifar, and ruled that this requirement was 
contrary to the principles of free competition. Nevertheless, the last round of 
negotiations between the NHS and the industry concluded with an agreement whereby 
the MoH accepted to implement rules to put a brake on parallel trade in exchange for 
the acceptance by the industry of new reference pricing arrangements and the creation 
of a general fund for pharmaceutical innovation and research. Finally, the MoH has 
stepped down by saying that this was just one of the possible options under study. 
Some additional issues in the development of parallel exports from Spain are the 
emergence of pharmaceutical shortages and potential future price increases for new 
on-patent drugs.  
 
7. Discussion  
  30 
This paper has sought to examine the regulation of the market for drugs in 
Spain, at the same time evaluating pharmaceutical policies in the last two decades. 
We argue that cost containment has been a very recent concern in pharmaceutical 
policy, which instead has centred on price regulation while volume control has been 
poorly targeted. The aggregate effect of policy tools in containing pharmaceutical 
expenditure has been modest, mainly due to the fact that most of the policies have 
been short-sighted (López Casasnovas, 2002). From the demand side, policies provide 
meagre incentives for quality and efficiency in prescription. Furthermore, cost sharing 
has not been used to monitor demand and delisting experiences have produced 
negligible results. The market regulation has failed to promote the penetration of 
generics and efficient prescription. The negotiation process with the industry has been 
excessively secretive and consumers and providers are not aware of the costs. 
Furthermore, though pharmaceuticals continue to be legislated by the State, 
devolution brings new challenges since the Autonomous Communities are now 
responsible for prescription and purchasing policies.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Although health expenditure in Spain is not much higher than in other systems 
with similar GDP levels, we argue that expenditure is driven by a comparatively small 
number of new products that rapidly achieve a high market share, along with a large 
(and increasing) quantity of prescribed medicines. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the current price regulation system encourages inefficient expenditure and 
overconsumption. Alternative ways of regulating prices, probably combining price 
regulations with profit regulations (Puig-Junoy, 1998), are to be recommended. Table 
7 presents the main policies implemented to control pharmaceutical expenditure. Of 
all cost-containment policies introduced, only the reduction in pharmaceutical 
margins in 1997 has actually reduced expenditure (Farmaindustria, 2002). This 
evidence is consistent with the view that the reduction of margins may affect the 
volume of drugs dispensed. The experiences of negative lists have led to a therapeutic 
revision of drugs reimbursed by the NHS rather than attempts to contain costs. 
 
  31Recent proposals range from establishing a fixed co-payment for the retired to 
increasing co-payment for active consumers. As noted above, cost sharing in 
pharmaceuticals is among the lowest in the EU countries, and while a relatively rich 
pensioner may pay nothing for drugs, a poor unemployed family with several children 
pay 40% of the prescription price. This situation may lead in the future to the 
inclusion of pensioners within the co-payment system. The current debate focuses on 
whether some additional co-payments possibly linked with income might improve the 
equity of the system (Costa-Font, 2003; Puig-Junoy and Llop, 2004). There is some 
evidence that co-payment tends to be concentrated in a small number of individuals: 
according to Ibern (1999), one third of co-payment revenue is concentrated in 2% of 
the population.  
 
The introduction of reference pricing in Spain has led to ambiguous results in 
reducing expenditure and promoting competition. Although prices have fallen in some 
drug categories, this has not been accompanied by expenditure reductions due to the 
incentives to produce new and more expensive drugs, together with the quantity of 
medicines prescribed. Furthermore, we have argued that short-term price reductions 
do not promote price competition in the medium term, since incentives for the entry 
of generics may be negatively affected and result in higher prices in the future.   
 
Policies that seek to raise consumer and provider awareness have been limited 
and have not produced significant results. Quality of prescription stands as one of the 
main issues, together with the regulation of drug promotion. The Cohesion and 
Quality Act passed in 2003 established the conditions of medical prescription and new 
responsibilities for the Spanish Agency for Pharmaceuticals in order to increase (by 
evaluating) the therapeutic value of new drugs. On the other hand, the share of 
generics still does not reveal impressive results. However, the health barometer 
published by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) in 2002 reveals that 64.2% of 
the Spanish population are in favour of generic substitution, 73.8% agree that 
pharmaceutical cost containment requires the participation of society and only 20.8% 
believe that cost containment is the responsibility of public authorities. Regarding 
generic consumption, 81% of those interviewed stated that they would prefer to 
consume generic drugs and 66% support generic substitution by pharmacists.   
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Table 1. New registered drugs 1992-2000 (in packs) 
 





















































Source: Directorate-General of Pharmacy and Health Products, 2001. 
 











Real expenditure per 
capita (€) 
1986     212 1,288  52.68 
1987     232  1,540  58.09 
1988     265  1,824  64.59 
1989     290  2,172  69.87 
1990 2,979  143  312  2,524  74.93 
1991 3,456  156  346  2,954  81.77 
1992 3,932  163  373  3,395  85.85 
1993 4,226  176  387  3,664  90.01 
1994 4,480  185  393  3,902  88.57 
1995 5,035  220  426  4,389  93.58 
1996 5,577  237  453  4,887  99.67 
1997 5,874  258  460  5,155  103.83 
1998 6,456  281  474  5,700  111.76 
1999 7,058  295  495  6,268  120.21 
2000 7,635  315  520  6,800  123.43 
2001 8,338  319  557  7,462  130.46 
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Average price per NHS prescription (constant 2002 
prices) in € 
% Retired 
consumers 
1986 460,866  3.44  56.6 
1987 470,390  3.99  57.8 
1988 491,249  4.50  59.2 
1989 509,875  5.11  60.3 
1990 532,231  5.63  61.5 
1991 541,057  6.45  62.7 
1992 548,646  7.27  64.1 
1993 534,559  8.01  65.4 
1994 520,463  8.70  67.4 
1995 553,788  9.17  68.3 
1996 581,561  9.68  68.9 
1997 593,046  9.99  69.3 
1998 592,330  10.99  70.1 
1999 599,604  11.88  71 
2000 628,654  12.26  71.9 
2001 653,917  12.90  72.2 
Source: Consejo General del Colegio de Farmacéuticos, 2003. 
 
Table 4. Breakdown of factors affecting public pharmaceutical expenditure in 
Spain 1991-2001 
 





























1991 -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1992 0.23  0.88  0.00  5.30  7.30  0.65  14.96 
1993 0.22  0.92  -3.82  4.90  5.30  0.41  7.90 
1994 0.18  0.94  -3.57  4.30  3.45  0.35  5.60 
1995 0.14  0.94  5.07  4.30  0.52  0.28  11.62 
1996 0.14  0.91  3.79  3.20  2.59  0.41  11.49 
1997 0.18  0.88  0.67  2.00  2.72  0.45  7.08 
1998 0.27  0.84  -1.46  1.40  8.84  0.56  10.57 
1999 0.44  0.76  -0.25  2.90  5.43  0.40  9.96 
2000 0.76  0.59  2.63  4.00  -0.01  0.16  7.48 























Notes: We have calculated the weighted population by pharmaceutical expenditure by age and gender 
quintile. Source: Urbanos R (2002). The demographic factors show the change in the population and 
the effect of the age structure using the coefficient of pharmaceutical expenditure by age and gender in 
1998. The change in intensity of use refers to the change in the number of prescriptions per person 
  36adjusted by age. Finally, specific inflation and changes in quality refer to the change in average price 
that exceeds the general price index.   
 
Table 5. Medicine price structure (share of different stakeholders) 1986-2000 
 
  1986-87 1988-92 1993-94 1995-1996  1997-1998 1999-2000 
Ex-factory  price  59  58.2 59.9 59.3  61.7  62.7 
Wholesaler’s 
margin 
8  7.9 8.2 8.1  7.6  6.6 
Retailer’s 
margin 
27.3 28.2 29  28.8  26.8  26.8 
VAT  5.7 5.7 2.9 3.8  3.9  3.9 
Source: Farmaindustria, 2001. 
 
Table 6. Evolution of pharmacies, density and sales 
  Number of pharmacies  Inhabitants/pharmacy  Sales per pharmacy (Mill€) 
1986 17,138  2,251  118.59 
1987 17,240  2,244  130.34 
1988 17,415  2,271  143.85 
1989 17,651  2,202  153.88 
1990 17,896  2,172  163.07 
1991 18,031  2,161  176.98 
1992 18,217  2,144  184.25 
1993 18,429  2,124  191.28 
1994 18,593  2,108  186.85 
1995 18,747  2,094  198.36 
1996 18,911  2,079  207.32 
1997 19,082  2,064  214.13 
1998 19,224  2,056  229.08 
1999 19,441  2,044  243.92 
2000 19,643  2,043  252.13 
2001 19,768  2,044  266.71 
Source: Consejo General del Colegio de Farmacéuticos, 2003. 
 
 
Table 7. Main cost-containment policies: goals and effects 
 
Policy Goals Effects 
Delisting experiences in 1993 and 
1998 
Savings and expenditure reduction  Short-term effects on expenditure 
and renewal of drug supply 
Price reductions (several years)  Reduction in prices and expenditure  Reduction in prices but limited effects 
on expenditure 
Information policies (several years)  To improve awareness of costs  Limited effects on agents 
Generic promotion and substitution 
(1996-2001) 
To improve market competition  Reduction of off-patent prices and 
rise in prices of generics 
Revision of pharmacists’ payment 
system 
Reduction of incentives to increase 
sales by dispensing overpriced drugs 
Significant effect on expenditure 
reduction 
Prescription incentives (1996)  To  provide incentives to physicians 
for efficient prescribing 
Little evidence to date 
Reference  pricing  (2000)  Expenditure reduction by reducing 
reimbursement to the reference price 
Little impact on either expenditure or 
competition, and reduction of prices 
of some drugs included in the 
“reference price” 
Industry repayments (1996-2004)  Contribution to financing expenditure 
on research and health care 
Short-term effects on expenditure 
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